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Private pension funds were thought to be an important pillar of old-age provision when they were in-
troduced throughout (Emerging) Europe. As different as these funds are in different countries with
regards to their regulation, their ownership structure and operation, none were immune to the
sub-prime led financial crisis. The Hungarian private pension funds are unique amongst the defined
contribution (DC) funds. With their decade old recent history, they are maturing to the payout period
in a few years’ time; however, their demise appears ever more realistic by means of political deci-
sion. This makes uncovering their investment policy during the crises very timely. Examining such
a period is of importance in shedding light on the behaviour of traditional financial concepts in peri-
ods of stress. In this paper, we assess the optimality of diversification, hedging and short sales deci-
sion possibilities of the Hungarian pension funds in the equity investments environment. Was the
net asset value (NAV) erosion suffered by the Hungarian private pension funds a result of their in-
vestment decision? We examine this question of diversification through a hypothetical simulation
of model investment portfolios. Our results show that international diversification yields better
risk-adjusted returns only in case of perfect hindsight of future market movements. The high corre-
lation of the stock indices globally in times of crises limits the benefits of diversification.
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INTRODUCTION
None of the pension schemes were immune to the effects of the credit crisis of
2007–2009; however, the impact of a crisis depends on the maturity of the funds
(Whitehouse 2009). The sub-prime led financial crisis caused massive losses in
net asset value (NAV) across the global investments arena. A prudent investment
policy, however, could optimise the return-risk trade-off. In this paper, we exam-
ine the effects diversification and short selling constraints could have had on the
Hungarian private pension funds (PPF) in such a period of negative returns. The
methodology used to measure risk and performance of investment portfolios is
overviewed in this paper.
It is generally acknowledged in the financial literature that diversification in in-
vestment portfolios is beneficial with regards to lowering idiosyncratic risk
(Markowitz 1952). Moreover, international diversification aims at lowering ex-
posure to a single country’s systemic risk. This effect of lowering the portfolio’s
risk depends on the combination of assets selected into the portfolio. The lower
the correlation between asset returns, the better the hedge achieved from combin-
ing them into a single investment portfolio (Wagner – Lau 1971). Notwithstand-
ing that, correlation coefficients are not stable in time (Boness et al. 1974) but are
rather observed to tend to one in times of crisis and economic shocks (Sheikh –
Qiao 2010). Our simulation exercise shows evidence to corroborate this. Conta-
gion is related to the high correlation coefficient in times of economic crisis. In
this paper, we look at the question of international diversification from the per-
spective of the Hungarian investors, i.e. the PPFs, in the period spanning a decade
between 1998–2009 and witnessing the century’s most dramatic financial crisis.
The peculiarity of the financial crisis was that it was centred on the financial sys-
tem. Previous crises were merely linked to the financial intermediary sector but
did not originate from it. The sub-prime led crisis shed light on the fundamental
problems of our modern financial system. Examining such a period is of impor-
tance in exploring the behaviour of traditional financial concepts in periods of
stress.
One of the questions of research is to examine whether private pension funds
should follow a policy of international diversification or should their investing ac-
tivity be limited to the domestic market. The second question is with regards to
limiting short selling. Both questions will be examined through the optimisation
of model investment portfolios.
Arguments in support of limiting diversification to the domestic market could
be explained by the foreign-currency risk, the risk of contagion from foreign mar-
kets and by indirect benefits such as externalities of supporting the local economy
and job creation that eventually benefit the pensioner to-be. Furthermore, in the
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case of a highly indebted country like Hungary, Hungarian investments abroad
would further contribute to financial instability (Mosolygó 2010). On the other
hand, alleviating constraints on international investments for private pension
funds appears to be more aligned with arguments supporting free market economy
and deregulation. An important aspect is the disruption of market equilibrium that
leads to the inefficient allocation of resources. Short sale constraints are favoured
due to lowered risk taking; however a global optimum on a risk-return surface
could be missed if the constraints apply.
In section 1 of this paper, we take an overview of the Hungarian private pen-
sion funds. Section 2 presents a global overview of the performance of the world’s
private pension funds based on reports made by the IMF and the OECD. In section
3 we explain the performance measurements in times of crises. Section 4 details
the methodology applied in our empirical work of portfolio optimisation based on
a tailor-made performance measure that is appropriate for crises periods. Then, in
section 5 we present empirical results of applying international diversification and
short selling with the purpose of finding the optimal model portfolios. In section 6
we evaluate the results of the optimisation exercise and give our final conclusion
regarding the investment policies of the Hungarian private pension funds.
1. THE HUNGARIAN PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS
The Hungarian private pension funds (PPF) are part of the three-pillared pension
system in Hungary that was created in 1997.1 In that new system employees join-
ing the labour market were obliged to join a PPF, and approximately 25% of their
whole pension contribution was paid to the private pension system. Those enter-
ing the labour market had to join the mixed system. Accordingly, when reaching
retirement age, pensioners would be entitled to social security benefit (w.r.t. the
monopillar benefit) in the measure of their former contribution (75%), which is
complemented with their own savings at the private pension fund accounts. It
should be noted that those who voluntarily joined the system lost retrospectively
the right to one-fourth of their pension promissory accrued up to 1998. Assuming
zero return in real terms on the private pension investments, an accumulation pe-
riod of 40 years is needed for the pension deriving from the multi-pillar system to
equal that of the pay-as-you-go, or the pure social security system (Matits 2009).
The private pension funds are a Hungarian speciality by their own right, a
‘Hungaricum’ of the country. This applies to their current form of existence, as
the ownership structure in the form of a cooperative pension fund owned by the
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members themselves is peculiar in its own way, not resembling any other pension
system.
The decade long history of these funds looks back on a hefty period character-
ised by years of rapid economic growth, and then struck by a financial crisis prob-
ably the most severe that history has witnessed so far after 1929–1933. Moreover,
this newly reformed system is peculiar also because in the case of Hungary the
erosion of private pension savings was critical for members nearing retirement
age, aggravated by the short accumulation period. At the start of the system in
1998, the entry into a private pension fund – that meant a switch of 25% of the fu-
ture pension benefit away from the public pension scheme – was not age re-
stricted. This resulted in having as much as 5.1% of the members retiring within
the coming 10 years based on data of the year 2009 after a very short accumulation
period.
The Hungarian pension system is burdened by a low retirement age and high
replacement ratio, relative to the international average. In order to maintain the
sustainability of the system, reforms that encourage increasing the ratio of
self-provision are necessary.
The juvenile three-pillar Hungarian pension system faced the financial crisis
with an accumulation period less than a decade old. The sub-prime mortgage led
financial crisis spread from overseas, and the collapse of the financial markets
eroded 20–30% of the Hungarian pension savings. The basis for the safe operation
of funded pension systems is the preservation of net asset value in real terms to en-
sure sufficient income for the members during payout years. The Hungarian pri-
vate pension funds, however, did not preserve even the nominal value of the mem-
bers’ incoming payments. The crisis thus shed light on the structural problems
that lay in the decisions taken by the investment managers.
The most important question in the operation of a pension fund is its invest-
ment policy, as it determines the return ensured by the fund. Naturally, perfor-
mance measures are affected by the timing of the shift towards equities. Most of
the countries benefited from the surge in equity markets before the 2007 crisis.
However, the Hungarian example was less fortunate, as shift towards equity
investments came at the time of the market collapse. According to Hungarian Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) and Association of Hungarian Investment
Fund and Asset Management Companies (Bamosz) data, the share of the pension
funds’ foreign investments within the equity universe of Hungarian pension fund
portfolios was 64% by 2009. The most important argument supporting interna-
tional investments is its diversification effect, which makes the whole portfolio
independent from the home country – specific risk.
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2. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OVERVIEW
As the value of financial assets and therefore pension savings substantially eroded
in the global markets, the potential erosion of the net asset value of future pensions
became a real threat for most of the developed countries. The study of Gillingham
et al. (2009) aimed at addressing the fiscal risks deriving from the losses incurred
by the pension funds by examining the effect of the crisis on pension investments
in 43 countries.
Up to 2007, global pension fund net asset value was on the rise in both nominal
value terms and in relation to GDP. According to information made available by
IMF, total assets of pension funds exceeded USD 26,853bn, corresponding to
35% of GDP on average by the end of 2007. Figure 1 below depicts the distribu-
tion of pension fund assets according to country of origin: USA makes up roughly
two-thirds, and the shares of seven further countries are outstanding.
By converting the figures to relative values in relation to the countries’ GDPs,
it becomes clear that a quarter of the countries have a high (i.e. above 50%) pen-
sion savings/GDP ratio (Figure 2). In almost two thirds of the countries, this ratio
is below 20%, but the tendency is a growing one for the funded part in the pension
system. The bull markets of the early 2000s and the general rise in risk appetite re-
sulted in equity investments dominating investment portfolios of pension funds.
In the UK and the USA, portfolios were made up of 58% equity, while in the other
countries the weight of equity was around 34% (IMF).
The average stock market decline weighted by the value of pension fund assets
was 34.6% in the countries examined between end-2007 and 30th June, 2009. The
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Figure 1. Distribution of pension fund assets
Source: Gillingham et al. (2009).
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exchange rate depreciation against the dollar caused a further 5% decline in re-
ported figures in USD terms. Thus, the total loss on equity amounted to USD
5.874 bn, 21.88% of the 2007 figure.
With these figures indicating immense asset erosion, the question arises
whether private pension funds were a victim of badly made investment decisions?
We will attempt to answer this question by looking at the hypothetically possible
investment outcomes of the past 10 years. We analyse whether the losses of the
Hungarian private pension funds were justifiable by the global market movements
or were a result of asset mismanagement, and how could they have avoided the
sharp fall of their value of their investments.
3. INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
In this section, we analyse the effects of investments strategies on the performance
equity investments of pension portfolios. We first address the issue of diversifica-
tion, and then the “common evil” as dubbed by many, namely short selling. We
investigate this through taking country indices to proxy well-diversified country
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Figure 2. Pension Funds’ assets as a % of GDP
Source: Gillingham et al. (2009).
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investment portfolios. We choose the following five markets for our empirical
analysis with corresponding index notations used by Bloomberg: US (DJI), UK
(UKX), Germany (DAX), Hungary (BUX) and Japan (NKY).
3.1. Diversification
The general rule is to diversify. Financial theory assumes well-diversified invest-
ments to be efficient. Orszag – Stiglitz (1999) name this as a dilemma of private
pension funds, however, they use it in the context of diversifying away from
bonds, into equities. Their resolution is indefinite in this matter. They regard the
question as being subject to the risk appetite of pension contributors. However, by
this they implicitly assume that equity investments are all efficient. Certainly, if
we accept market efficiency in capital markets, then the choice of moving along
the capital allocation line (CAL) in a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) context
is subject to individual utility functions and risk aversion. The matter of the fact is,
however, that investment choices world-wide are far from efficient, and therefore
diversification, as a tool to mitigate excess risk, has to be undertaken by the indi-
vidual pension funds to ensure efficient investments. The question whether to di-
versify or not can be examined empirically by looking at correlations of index re-
turns. Table 1 below shows that the Hungarian main stock index (BUX) has a sig-
nificant positive correlation with the international indices. However, the correla-
tion is semi-strong, which gives grounds for investigating the effects of diversifi-
cation. It is also interesting to note that correlations are not stable in time and do
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Table 1
Index return correlations
Years BUX, BUX, BUX, BUX, UKX, UKX, UKX, DJI, DJI, DAX,
UKX DJI DAX NKY DJI DAX NKY DAX NKY NKY
1999 0.38 0.41 0.55 0.26* 0.53 0.69 0.39 0.59 0.48 0.44
2000 0.54 0.24 0.57 0.27 0.55 0.62 0.40 0.50 0.43 0.40
2001 0.61 0.60 0.72 0.49 0.83 0.91 0.44 0.83 0.35 0.48
2002 0.43 0.45 0.58 0.31 0.78 0.84 0.25 0.82 0.30 0.35
2003 0.39 0.37 0.47 0.47 0.84 0.83 0.36 0.80 0.37 0.48
2004 0.34 0.35 0.55 0.58 0.76 0.83 0.53 0.83 0.55 0.66
2005 0.48 0.42 0.38 0.30 0.65 0.81 0.57 0.71 0.52 0.62
2006 0.68 0.54 0.65 0.40 0.69 0.87 0.62 0.80 0.49 0.69
2007 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.68 0.82 0.91 0.76 0.76 0.70 0.67
2008 0.66 0.61 0.71 0.70 0.87 0.96 0.86 0.86 0.75 0.88
2009 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.86 0.91 0.59 0.87 0.61 0.61
Notes: Figures with * are statistically insignificant. Bolded figures mean correlations above 0.6.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on Bloomberg data.
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get stronger in times of crises. The years 2001, and 2008–09 have high correla-
tions in most cases.
Most of the figures are significant on a 5% significance level based on the
t-test. It can be observed that correlation coefficients are very strong (above 0.9)
during the years 2008–2009 of the financial crisis. This empirical finding is cor-
roborated by Sheikh – Qiao (2010) who give account for this phenomenon that
during times of distress correlations tend to 1, thereby instigating contagion.
Figure 3 depicts the returns of the BUX and the UKX indices and the range of
maximum and minimum returns of the 5 indices for the period 1999–2009 is
shaded. It graphically shows the reverse relationship between asset returns and re-
turn correlations.
The question of asset allocation between risky and risk-free assets is investi-
gated by Haberman – Vigna (2002). They establish that the distribution of assets
should be based on risk appetite and the time left until retirement. The longer the
time to retirement and the greater the risk appetite, the higher asset risk may be
taken. The OECD suggests a similar life-cycle investment-strategy, reducing the
ratio of risky assets as the member approaches retirement age (Whitehouse 2009).
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Figure 3. Returns of the BUX and UKX index with an illustration of the correlation
between the returns
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The Hungarian portfolio allocation system conforms to this principle by catego-
rising members based on age into three levels of risk portfolios. The members
may opt for a lower risk category than their initial default categorisation, however,
they may not enter a higher risk category.
Now, we take a look at measuring performance in a risk-return trade-off frame-
work.
3.2 Risk-adjusted performance measures
In the context of classical portfolio theory, investment decision criteria are made
along the risk-return trade-off; investors aim to maximise returns on their invest-
ments while minimising the risks incurred. Most investment criteria measures are
based on a return-risk ratio. Despite the variations, essentially all ratios attempt to
capture a measure of asset returns against a measure of risk. These are collectively
called mean-variance analysis (MVA) and the most common of these is the
Sharpe ratio (1966). Other variations include the Treynor ratio, Jensen’s alpha,
and the appraisal ratio. This school of investment decision making attempts to
capture excess return of the asset over a benchmark. This benchmark is often the
risk-free asset’s return. The risk measures in these models are represented by the
variation in returns. Variability makes returns unpredictable, and susceptible to
unfavourable movements, which makes it a generally accepted proxy of risk.
However, the Sharpe ratio has suffered from significant drawbacks due to several
of its restraining assumptions, including the instability of correlation matrices
through time.
It has been shown that assumptions regarding the 4th moment relative to the
square of the variance, kurtosis, predict less extreme results than what has been
empirically observed (Rachev – Menn – Fabozzi 2005). Extreme outcomes have a
low probability of occurrence but have severe effects once they happen. This
property has been coined in finance as the ‘fat-tail’ distribution of returns. The
significance of this fact brought attention to risk management which prompted the
birth of the “at risk” measures (Jorion 2007). The concept was to derive a simple
measure of the amount at stake – whether it be value or cash flow – within a speci-
fied time frame at a given confidence interval. The origin of “value at risk” models
was preceded by the need to capture possible negative outcomes.
Similar concerns arose when a revision of the traditional performance mea-
sures was being overviewed. The question was whether standard deviation of re-
turns is a suitable proxy for risk. The very underlying assumptions of the tradi-
tional asset pricing models were deemed too strict, and the fact that they did not
hold up drew attention to their deficiency. The assumption of normality of returns
Acta Oeconomica 61 (2011)
INVESTMENTS DECISIONS IN CRISES 397
Brought to you by Corvinus University | Unauthenticated | Downloaded 07/23/20 06:41 PM UTC
caused underestimation of the frequency of high returns in both directions. Fur-
thermore, too large positive returns were considered similarly risky as large
losses. Unexpected large gains do not cause as much of a disturbance in handling
them, which makes their treatment in risk measurement unfair. An asymmetric
measurement of return-risk was being called for not long before Rom – Ferguson
(1994) of the Pension Research Institute at San Francisco State University coined
the phrase of downside risk (DR), thereby insinuating that the measure of variance
to model risk is biased. This was corroborated by empirical evidence that sup-
ported the view that the standard deviation risk measure and the use of the Sharpe
ratio works well in an up-market. Nevertheless, traditional investment perfor-
mance measures consistent with modern portfolio theory (MPT) fail to capture the
risk asymmetry between positive and negative extreme returns. During times of
recession, when asset prices are falling and returns are concentrated in the left
range of the distribution, the deficiency of the standard deviation-based risk mea-
sures becomes especially ailing.
This promoted the use of the newly introduced DR amongst researchers, and
foreran the development of the post-modern portfolio theory (PMPT). Price –
Sortino (1994) were leading researchers to use the new concept in the ratio that
became a special case of the Sharpe ratio. In the numerator, instead of looking at
excess return above the riskless rate, the Sortino ratio replaces the risk-free return
used in the Sharpe version with a benchmark return set by the investment fund and
calls it minimal acceptable return (MAR) or the threshold. This is a convenient so-
lution as it allows freedom to set one’s own MAR at the level that serves the pur-
pose of one’s performance measurement criteria. In the case of pension funds,
since we are examining the equity investments in solitude, no comparison is made
to the bond market; therefore we set our own benchmark at zero return. The de-
nominator contains DR, a risk measure capturing dispersion in the downside and
not penalising returns in the upside. Therefore, downside risk satisfies the need
for a tailored risk measure.
A similar measure used in the literature is semi-variance, which is congruent
with DR. With similar aims as DR, the two measures coincide when MAR equals
the mean. Semi-variance penalises returns below the mean, while DR allows for
the arbitrary choice of the benchmark performance.
Semi-variance  


1 2
n
r rt
r rt
* ( )
where n is the number of observations (weekly returns) that satisfy the rt < r
rt is the weekly return in time t
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We now move on to the application of this risk measure in the evaluation of the
performance of portfolios.
4. PORTFOLIO EVALUATION
There are several pitfalls for applying traditional investment performance evalua-
tion techniques to portfolios that were managed during financial crises when asset
prices witness sharp falls. Some of these were presented in the literature review. In
this section, we present our results for the simulated optimal investment portfo-
lios, optimised according to modern and post-modern performance measures.
4.1 Portfolio constituents
When carrying out the simulation, we represent each country as a single pension
fund. Furthermore, portfolio selection is made once a year at the beginning of
each year. The choice of portfolio elements was confined to indices of countries
according to the criteria of investibility. This is a mixture of having a suitable in-
vestment environment, low regulatory risk, reasonable history of investment cul-
ture, developed financial and legal system and sufficient volume of trade to pro-
vide adequate liquidity. Taking these criteria into consideration, we choose 5 mar-
kets including Hungary. These markets are London, Frankfurt, New York, and
Tokyo, represented by the FTSE-100, Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX), Dow Jones
Industrial, and the Nikkei indices, respectively.
We assume that investment decisions are made annually, by allocating funds to
be invested in equity-type of investments, amongst the above mentioned indices.
Reallocation of the portfolios occurs at the beginning of each fiscal year. To ana-
lyse the performance of the portfolios, we calculate the annual effective returns of
the indices and in case of foreign currency investments we adjust for the foreign
exchange rate effect by creating a hypothetical hedging policy. For hedging, a
covered interest rate parity approach is used, according to which the Libor (Lon-
don Interbank Offered Rate) differences in the currencies are added to the returns,
assuming that all foreign investments are hedged through forward agreements on
a day-by-day basis. Maurer – Valiani (2007) showed the dominance of forward
hedge on hedging through put options, however, investigating other hedging pos-
sibilities is beyond the scope of this paper. We have chosen forward hedge as it is
a simple method to follow.
For the 10 year period examined we assume a domestic investment strategy
that is based on the largest market capitalisation and most liquid stocks traded on
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the Budapest Stock Exchange. These are well-represented by the BUX index, the
primary capitalisation-weighted index. We compare the performance of the do-
mestic investment portfolio to the alternative portfolios having the possibility to
invest into four other indices as well.
Figure 4 shows the relative performance of the five indices taking the start date
7th January, 1999 as the base. Daily returns are calculated in comparison to the
base. We see that all foreign indices remain in the range of –50% to +150%. The
BUX index’s behaviour is an exception rising four-fold and then halving from the
peak. Here, movements are more hectic and volatility exceeds the peers by far.
4.2 Short selling
An important aspect of investment policy concerns permitting short selling. The
issue is controversial and the literature on the subject is extended. Short selling is a
position taken at the vendor side of a transaction, when the undertaker is not in
possession of the assets being sold. This problem can be overcome by borrowing
the assets from the broker who will guarantee the underlying asset. As a guaran-
tee, the short seller is required to fill up a margin account that maintains a mini-
mum amount sufficient to close the position should the asset price rise to levels
that the margin account does not cover. So far, there is nothing peculiar about this.
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Figure 4. Relative performance of indices (January 1999 – December 2009).
Source: Bloomberg data.
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The eyes of the regulators turned towards another type of short selling, one in
which the selling party does not possess the underlying asset, and does not borrow
it at the time of the transaction. These naked short sales were responsible for
allowing the derivatives market to outgrow the underlying assets. Put in simple
terms, the number of contracts on derivatives was in excess of the amount of un-
derlying assets during the sub-prime crisis. If all the participants wanted to
close-off their positions at the same time, there would have been no sufficient un-
derlying assets to deliver. The infamous Volkswagen case2 that took place in the
autumn 2008 was the practical manifestation of a short squeeze. The risks in-
curred by shorting a stock stems from the asymmetric risks incurred by the long
and the short positions. Since the spot price can theoretically increase to infinity;
the loss function of the short position can reach infinity. However, the drop in as-
set price is limited to the current spot price i.e. a stock can be worth zero, in the
worst case, but cannot be a liability for those who own it. Therefore, the maximum
loss incurred by the holder of long positions is the spot price itself, which is a lim-
ited amount. On the contrary, the upside for the long position is unlimited. Despite
all the risks, limiting short selling in investment allocations will mathematically
lead to only local optimums. Caroenrook – Daouk (2008) showed empirically that
allowing short sales improves market efficiency by reducing volatility and in-
creasing liquidity.
The practice of short selling in Hungary was always confined to covered deals,
therefore Hungarian funds were never exposed to the risky naked short positions
as opposed to the U.S. and Western Europe. However, we were still able to benefit
from this to enhance portfolio optimisation on the long term without taking on ex-
cessive risks. Currently, regulation in Hungary requires disclosure of opened
short positions ever since a mistaken order by a broker caused a price sway during
the final years of the crisis. The practice itself, however, is not very efficient as the
closure of these short positions does not require reporting to the financial watch-
dog.
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2 The German car-making industry was seen to be coming to a downturn at the beginning of the
post-Lehman period, therefore hedge funds mostly had reason to speculate on the short term
price fall of automobile stocks. Large short positions were opened on these stocks amongst
them the share of Volkswagen (VW). The manufacturer of the Beetle was however spotted as
an acquisition target by rival Porsche, which had purchased a sizeable amount of VW shares.
When this was announced to the market, investors in the short positions were unable to close
their positions due to the lack of liquidity, sufficient supply of the stock on the market, a phe-
nomenon called a short squeeze. The price of VW shot up to EUR 900 within hours of trading
and became the single most expensive company world-wide. The DAX index in which VW is
a constituent was thrashed to highs as it is a capitalisation-weighted index. In 2008, while the
car-manufacturing industry was ailing, Porsche reported (1H 2008/2009) a net profit of EUR 7
bn, mostly driven up by the financial gain on the VW trades, not by car sales (Gregoriou 2011).
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4.3 Diversification
International diversification is proxied by four portfolios that are constructed ac-
cording to different optimisation strategies. These optimal portfolios assume per-
fect knowledge of the future outcome of the markets. In other words, they repre-
sent the highest returns attainable – with respect to the risk factor – that is known
with hindsight. Our strategies involve optimising ex-post return versus risk based
on the Sharpe and the Sortino ratios; we also handle the question of imposing
short selling constraints. The combination of these considerations yielded the four
optimal portfolios based on the optimising strategies:
– Sortino long only (LO)
– Sortino long/short (L/S)
– Sharpe long only (LO)
– Sharpe long/short (L/S)
In our empirical tests, we measure the performance of these portfolios against
the BUX index.
The five indices available for investment were moulded into portfolios using
optimisation criteria according to the possibility of short selling and whether we
considered risk as the variance of the whole spectrum of possible returns or re-
garded downside risk as the primary risk measure.
The optimisation problem thus resulted in asset weights to be used in the port-
folios. In long/short portfolios, asset weight was limited to –100% of the stock.
This constraint is arbitrary, but necessary. As shown by Kondor – Varga-
Haszonits (2008) with no limit to the weight of the single indices, and when re-
turns are negative for some assets and positive for others, the ex-post optimal
weights will tend toward ± infinity. Applying the constraints results in an opti-
mum along the constraint line; therefore the choice of the limit will determine the
optimal weights. Although mathematically restraining, from an economics point
of view, the assumption of a given limit is more realistic.
4.4 Optimisation criteria: Sharpe ratio versus Sortino’s ratio
The optimisation along the risk-return trade-off is chosen according to two crite-
ria: the Sharpe and the Sortino ratios. Both measure return versus risk, but differ in
the definition of risk. Traditionally, the Sharpe ratio was used first as it chronolog-
ically preceded the Sortino measure. Sharpe (1966) came up with a ratio to mea-
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sure excess return per unit of risk. He measured risk with the variability of stock
returns, i.e. standard deviation. The Sharpe ratio is defined as:
Sharpe
r ri f
i


s
where ri is the weekly return for asset i
rf is the risk-free rate of return
i is the standard deviation of returns of asset i.
In our adaptation of the Sharpe ratio, we omit the subtraction of the risk-free
rate for several reasons. From an economics perspective, we are examining the eq-
uity portfolio of pension funds; therefore no benchmark is set against the bond
market returns. Also, the performance of the portfolios is measured in the same
currency (HUF), so we are neglecting the risk-free rate as we are investigating
risky investments, represented by equities. From a technical point of view, the
Hungarian government bond yield exceeded those of the stock market during the
period of the sub-prime crisis, making the Sharpe ratio not meaningful. Our adap-
tive Sharpe measure is defined as:
adaptive Sharpe
ri
i

 0
s
The rationale behind our adaptive measure is to measure nominal return,
vis-à-vis the excess mean return above a certain threshold as used by other mea-
surement criteria. We emphasise maintenance in nominal terms by deducting
zero, indicating that this is a variation of indicators that incorporate a deduction of
a certain threshold (risk-free return in the case of the Sharpe measure, and mini-
mum acceptable return for the Sortino measure).
The shortcoming of the Sharpe ratio is that it cannot be defined for negative re-
turns. For this reason, the Sortino ratio takes return in excess of a threshold set by
the fund management and is not linked to the risk-free rate as in the case of the
Sharpe ratio. The Sortino measure follows a different interpretation of risk. This
risk-adjusted measure penalises variability of returns only those below the thresh-
old. In our case, the threshold is zero. Therefore, the risk measure is replaced by
downside risk that considers only negative returns to be risky.
Sortino
r t
dr
i


,
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where
dr
n
MAR rt
r MAR
 


1 2( )
t is the threshold, zero in our case
n is the number of observations (weekly returns) that satisfy rt< MAR
rt is the weekly return in time t
MAR: minimum acceptable return.
5. PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
Thus, optimal portfolios were created according to four optimisation criteria with
posterior knowledge. The annualised returns of the indices were taken into each
portfolio according to their respective optimal weight vectors obtained for each
year. We maintain portfolio composition for one year and allow reselection at the
beginning of the fiscal year. First, we examine the case where foreign exchange
risk is controlled by hedging. Second, we examine the case where the currency
changes are incorporated in the performance results.
5.1 Performance of portfolios
Figure 5 demonstrates the performance (in returns) of the BUX index against the
range of minimum and maximum returns of four selected investment strategies
(filled with grey). It can be observed that the performance range is contoured by
the BUX returns, indicating that in most of the times the single-index investment
is out-performing or under-performing the other portfolios. Such extreme behav-
iour is what we aim at reducing. We argue that diversification reduces the hectic
movements in returns. This benefit is empirically bolstered.
By analysing weekly returns, diversification results in higher returns for all
four optimisation cases. The risk-adjusted performance of the diversified portfo-
lios proved to be statistically better in comparison to the BUX index during the ex-
amined period (Table 2). The ex-post optimal portfolios offered not only a signifi-
cantly more stable performance – which is trivial by definition – but a higher re-
turn level as well.
With regards to the correlation of returns, the BUX index returns’ correlation
with the diversified portfolios’ returns is medium (between 0.52 and 0.68), giving
a sound reason for further analysis (Table 3).
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Figure 5. Performance range of model portfolios against the BUX index (annual returns)
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 2
T-test for equality, p-values3
Sortino Sortino Sharpe Sharpe
LO LS LO LS
Hedged average weekly returns against BUX 0.014 0.026 0.021 0.016
Hedged risk-adjusted performance against BUX 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000
Unhedged average weekly returns against BUX 0.040 0.116 0.044 0.016
Unhedged risk-adjusted performance against BUX 0.008 0.014 0.003 0.001
Hedged risk-adjusted performance against unhedged 0.491 0.039 0.200 0.186
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 3
Correlation matrix of portfolio returns
Sortino LO Sortino LS Sharpe LO Sharpe LS BUX
Sortino LO 1 0.831 0.995 0.863 0.673
Sortino LS 0.831 1 0.833 0.978 0.519
Sharpe LO 0.995 0.833 1 0.869 0.680
Sharpe LS 0.863 0.978 0.869 1 0.595
BUX 0.673 0.519 0.680 0.595 1
Source: Authors’ calculation.
3 The null-hypothesis of the test is that the expected values are equal. Low p-values (under 0.05)
mean the rejection of H0.
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Our analysis shows that international diversification improves the perfor-
mance of the investment considered on a risk-return basis. All optimisation strate-
gies resulted in a more stable portfolio performance than investing only in a single
market index. The key element of our model was the assumption of full hedging of
currency risk, and thereby the elimination of interest rate differentials between the
Hungarian forint (HUF) and the other currencies. Unless the foreign currency risk
was hedged, the returns on foreign investments would be significantly lower –
even negative in many of the cases – than the Hungarian single index investment
return. As a consequence, we question the positive effect diversification may have
on performance.
We calculated the optimal portfolios according to the four optimisation criteria
using the unhedged returns as well. In this case we converted the foreign currency
denominated investments at the corresponding exchange rates to HUF. The new
optimal portfolios showed similar returns as the hedged ones, except for the
Sortino LS optimisation, where the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected. In
all other cases, the unhedged optimal portfolio-returns are significantly higher
than the BUX index returns. Adjusting for risk, the performance of the unhedged
diversified portfolios exceeded the BUX index in all optimisation cases.4 The
Sharpe/Sortino measures of the unhedged ex-post optimal portfolios are signifi-
cantly higher than that of the BUX-returns.
Comparing the annual Sortino/Sharpe measures of the unhedged and hedged
portfolios the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected, except for the case of
Sortino optimisation that allows short selling (Table 2).
5.2 Portfolio concentration
The optimal portfolios show similar performance for both hedged and unhedged
optimisation, but have differing compositions. We examined the portfolio
weights according to two aspects: the relative value of the BUX index and concen-
tration. The weight of the BUX index in the optimal portfolios is 58% higher on
average, if the returns are not hedged. During the examined period the high inter-
est rate difference in favour of the HUF came hand in hand with a stable perfor-
mance of the foreign currencies: this implies that the purchasing power parity did
not hold up. As the exchange rate depreciation stayed below the level anticipated
by the covered interest rate parity, the benefit of diversification was smaller with-
out hedging the exchange rate (Table 4).
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4 By definition, if correlations are less than perfectly positive.
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In order to examine the effect of hedging on the concentration of the optimal
portfolio weights we calculated the Herfindahl-indices (HI) for each year. As the
HI index can be interpreted for positive values, we compared the index values of
hedged and unhedged optimal portfolios using Sortino and Sharpe optimisation
without short selling to avoid negative figures. The values of the HI were very
high in most of the cases, and during several years the portfolios were composed
of a single index, given the short sale constraint. According to Table 6, hedging,
on the other hand, did not affect the level of concentration. Portfolio weights are
shown in bar charts in the Annex.
5.3 Comparing performance of different realistic strategies
Optimal portfolios are modelled with posterior knowledge with the benefit of
hindsight. We create portfolios for pension fund managers based on the knowl-
edge of the yesteryear, that we label pilot portfolios. Keeping transaction costs at a
minimum, we allow for portfolio element selection once a year at the beginning of
that year. We use the optimal weights obtained for a certain year and we apply
them in our investment strategy in the following year.
This strategy of using lagged weights for portfolio allocation results in lower
returns than that of the BUX index for all optimisation methods, the differences
however, are statistically insignificant in all cases (Table 5).
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Table 4
Comparing the composition of hedged and unhedged optimal portfolios
Hedged Unhedged Hedged portfolios versus
portfolios, % portfolios, % unhedged portfolios, p-values
Weight of BUX index 25 38 0.00
Average of HI-indices 79 80 0.36
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Table 5
Comparing performance of strategies against BUX, p-values
Sortino Sortino Sharpe Sharpe EW
LO LS LO LS
Hedged pilot and equally weighted portfolios’ 0.206* 0.432* 0.203* 0.441* 0.350*
weekly returns against BUX
Hedged pilot and equally weighted portfolios’ 0.226* 0.406* 0.373* 0.418* 0.238*
risk adjusted performance against BUX
Note: Figures with * are statistically insignificant.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Testing the risk-adjusted performance measures of the pilot portfolios shows
that portfolio allocation according to the performance of the previous year does
not enhance performance (Table 5).
In search for a passive investment strategy that aims at diversification but as-
signs no significance to index allocation could be an equally-weighted (EW) in-
vestment portfolio. This strategy also indicates insignificant differences in perfor-
mance.
5.4 The effect of short sales constraints
Allowing short sales contributes to finding the optimum, but raises risk, as the loss
potential of a short position is theoretically infinite (as shown in 4.2). In order to
investigate the benefit of short selling, we compared the performance of the port-
folios with and without short sales constraints. The risk-adjusted measures proved
to be significantly higher in three cases, but for the pilot portfolio optimisation the
long/short portfolios have not exceeded the constrained portfolios’ performance
(Table 6).
6. CONCLUSION
This paper does not concentrate on the problems concerning long term financial
sustainability, nor on the demographic challenges. We skipped the choice be-
tween defined benefit and defined contribution pension systems, and have not
listed arguments on the further increase of consumption or private pension sav-
ings as sources of GDP growth.
This paper investigates the effect of the investment policy, whether interna-
tional diversification and short selling constraints do affect performance, espe-
cially in times of crises. The optimal share of riskless investments is beyond the
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Table 6
T-test for paired sample for equality of risk adjusted performance
Long only portfolio Long/short portfolio p-values
Sortino ratio of hedged portfolios 0.321 0.399 0.014
Sharpe ratio of hedged portfolios 0.182 0.210 0.003
Sortino ratio of unhedged portfolios 0.321 0.306 0.247
Sharpe ratio of unhedged portfolios 0.172 0.197 0.005
Sortino ratio of pilot portfolios 0.125 0.139 0.403
Sharpe ratio of pilot portfolios 0.072 0.086 0.332
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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subject matter of this paper. We compared the attributes of a portfolio consisting
of Hungarian stocks (represented by the BUX index) with internationally diversi-
fied optimal portfolios. By analysing the returns of 5 stock indices (including the
BUX) in the period of 1999–2009, we optimised model portfolios based on four
performance measurement criteria using the Sortino and Sharpe ratios and both
allowing and prohibiting short selling. We found that based on ex-post returns, di-
versified portfolios ensured higher return and better risk-adjusted performance
than the single index investment. Assuming a dynamic perfect forward hedge in
investment policy, we examined the effect of hedging on the portfolios’ composi-
tion. Concentration proved to be independent of hedging policy. In reality, the
best allocation is not foreseen; the optimal allocation is based on posterior perfor-
mance. Using the ex-post best allocation of the yesteryear resulted in similar re-
turns and risk-adjusted performance, as investment into the BUX index only, and
so did the equally-weighted portfolios. Therefore, we conclude that without the
benefit of hindsight, the use of international diversification becomes questionable
especially that the foreign exchange risk aspect cannot be mitigated perfectly by
hedging. Another conclusion of this paper is that allowing short sales results in
significantly higher risk-adjusted performance (with a minor exception of
unhedged Sortino).
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Optimal weights of hedged return, Sortino LO
Optimal weights of hedged return, Sharpe LO
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Optimal weights of unhedged return, Sortino LO
Optimal weights of unhedged return, Sharpe LO
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